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An age of austerity presents considerable challenges for those engaged in purposeful acts aiming 
to regenerate communities of places. Driven by an intense period of global economic uncertainty 
and a crippling banking crisis, the last rites were effectively read for holistic notions of area-based 
regeneration in England across the space of a few months. Of central concern to this research is 
investigating the recalibrated urban policy measures involving the examination of the transition 
from a dense national regeneration framework accompanied by a plethora of area-based 
initiatives to a minimalistic ‘regeneration’ toolkit to enable growth. Drawing on interviews with 
some principal agents of regeneration, the paper explores emerging new agendas. The research 
material generated indicates that the public policy field of regeneration has largely been 
subsumed by a single-minded pursuit of economic growth as a spatially unjust neoliberal toolkit is 
unmasked. Views from practitioners, however, also indicate the complexity of actually existing 
regeneration projects as well as some potentially progressive activities associated with the retreat 
of the state. 
 





Urban regeneration programmes and area-based initiatives can be distinguished from 
other public policies because of their geographic focus. That is to say that particular 
places are designated for special forms of state assistance beyond the norm, ie urban 
regeneration sites. Although not always referred to as regeneration, such special 
assistance has been a defining feature of state policies around the world from the 
1940s onwards: whether upgrading slum conditions in Bogotá or revitalising the post-
industrial waterfronts of Boston. Certainly not beyond criticism in conceptual terms, 
specific regeneration practices — from estate renewal to the renaissance of 
commercial quarters — continue to generate heated public debate and raise some 
fundamental political questions. Yet, a mainstay of urban regeneration theory and 
discourse has been its explicit or implicit aim to ameliorate some of the social, 
economic and environmental injustices produced by capitalist modes of production: 
namely, uneven patterns of development. 
Over the past four decades in the case of countries such as the UK and the US, but 
more recently for other countries such as China, public policies have, in broad terms, 
shifted from redistribution towards more market enabling approaches consistent with 
neoliberal political outlooks. Nevertheless, the variegated forms and effects of actually 
existing neoliberalisation need to be acknowledged. Thus, according to Jamie Peck, 
the fiscal purging of recurrent neoliberal acts has resulted ‘in the cumulative 
incapacitation of the state’.1 This would imply that the current age of austerity presents 
considerable challenges for holistically framed patterns of regeneration that many 
communities of need around the world grew accustomed to over the past two 
decades. Yet, recent empirically informed research, which may help to reveal some of 
the actually existing patterns of austerity-induced regeneration, has been noticeably 
lacking. There is a critical gap in knowledge of the framings of English regeneration 
since the UK General Election in 2010, partly because of a renewed and all-
encompassing political discourse of ‘localism’.2 Critical questions relating to whether a 
transformation in state-led regeneration policies has actually materialised or whether 
such a shift has been focused on appearance or the substantive form of regeneration 
have remained largely unexplored.3 It is these questions that framed the research 
project reported in this paper. 
 
Backdrop 
Legislation by Thatcher’s Conservative Government paved the way for a range of 
market-oriented regeneration ventures, including Urban Development Corporations 
(UDCs) and Enterprise Zones (EZs) in the 1980s, to which more recent reincarnations 
such as Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs), Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) and City Deals continue to bear some similar neoliberal hallmarks, albeit 
variegated in their spatial manifestations. It could be argued that a series of policies 
designed to achieve quick ‘wins’ have predominated over longer-term strategic planning 
and spatially inclusive ideals. This reveals an underlying tension between more holistic 
targets that favour social objectives (seeking to serve local communities at large) and 
those seeking narrowly to organise and control space to maximise economic growth 
(primarily benefiting individuals and corporations through capital accumulation) that 
target areas of development and economic opportunity. 
During the 1990s, the Conservative Government introduced the competitive 
‘challenge funding’ approach, which included initiatives such as City Challenge and the 
Single Regeneration Budget. The popularity of competitive bidding regimes did wane 
to some extent under successive Labour Governments between 1997 and 2010. For 
example, flagship redistributive initiatives such as New Deal for Communities and the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Fund were based on quantitative measures of multiple 
deprivation that sought to targets areas of need. Competitive bidding remained 
prominent, however, as it became accepted among a growing neoliberal repertoire of 
regeneration tools. 
With an economy still reeling from the effects of the 2007–08 credit crunch and a 
global economic downturn, it was apparent that the favoured (housing-led) model of 
regeneration predicated on the wide availability and easy access to relatively cheap 
credit to which the UK’s public-, private- and third-sector interests had become 
accustomed was no longer financially viable.4 A change in the orientation and practice 
of state-led regeneration was thus apparent prior to the 2010 General Election, 
epitomised in the Treasury-led 2007 Sub-National Review of Economic Development and 
Regeneration (SNR).5 The election, however, provided a defining moment for the 
practice of regeneration and the significance of regeneration as a national urban policy 
concern. Upon accession to office, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government proposed what they claimed would be a radical ‘new model’ to rebalance 
the economy of England.6 As a discourse and policy goal, ‘regeneration’ was sidelined 
by the interwoven narratives of ‘localism’ and ‘economic growth’, closely aligned with the 
Coalition’s imperative to reduce the public budget deficit and to ease the reliance on 
public-sector employment. Although politics and discourses differ markedly around the 
world, many nation-states and especially those members of the European Union have 
accepted the necessity of fiscal austerity. Consequently, debate has been limited to the 
depth of cuts, the speed of implementation and the spatial distribution of such 
measures. 
English regeneration programmes withered as funding was reduced by around two-
thirds of the resources committed under previous spending rounds.7 This headline 
figure arguably disguises deeper cuts to resources made available for holistic forms of 
regeneration, especially when one considers that new ‘regeneration’ resources include 
initiatives such as infrastructure enhancements, primarily focused on delivering 
economic growth that are essentially loans rather than grants (eg Growing Places 
Fund). 
Significantly, at the end of 2012, ‘for the first time in over forty years there are no area 
based initiatives targeted at the most deprived parts of England’.8 The repercussions of a 
spatially unjust fiscal revanchism are potentially far reaching: for example, the ‘extreme 
measures’ taken by some US cities, such as the decision to permanently remove 1,300 
street lights in Michigan.1 
This paper analyses English regeneration policy during austere socio-economic times. It 
explores whether the shift towards ‘austerity-era regeneration’ is due to a pragmatic 
strategy to weather the economic storm or whether it could indicate a more covert strategy 
to complete the right-wing ideological ‘mission’ fundamentally to reconstitute the role of 
the state, initiated by the Thatcher administration of the 1980s. Focusing on England as a 
window through which actually existing neoliberal repertoires can be examined may help 
to elucidate some broader trends associated with austerity politics and places under 
austerity rule. More modestly, the shifting contours of regeneration during an age of fiscal 
revanchism may serve to illustrate some of the repercussions when debates about the 
merits of regeneration are curtailed by a discourse that is only concerned with the depth 
and pace of cuts. 
 
Methodology 
The empirical and secondary research that forms the basis of the research used for 
the analysis in this paper was carried out between 2010 and 2012.The aim of the 
research was to develop an understanding of the impact of the Coalition Government’s 
urban policies and the emerging era of austerity for the regeneration landscape in 
England. One of the key tasks was to compile a comprehensive desk-based literature 
review; this was completed by examining key contemporary and historical policy 
documents, relevant academic research and reports from think-tanks. To provide 
further depth, including qualitative information on what the era of austerity means for 
regeneration policy at the micro level, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
a number of regeneration and economic development practitioners (in the public, 
private and community sectors).The programme of interviews remains ongoing, as the 
research continues to track the shifting contours of state-led regeneration policy. 
Analysis is therefore provisional and explorative, with more detailed research reports 
and publications subject to follow. This paper discusses some of the key issues that 
research participants highlighted within the new paradigm of austere public policy and 




In the first substantive section, divergent interpretations of the practice of regeneration 
are analysed. The purpose is to understand the competing narratives and motivations 
that have guided the formulation and implementation of regeneration policy. By this 
means, the goal is to analyse the holistic conceptualisation of regeneration that 
integrates social, economic and environmental facets. This approach will be contrasted 
with a more economically focused approach to regeneration, which began to appear 
after the first decade of Labour rule (c. 2007) and which has been intensified but also 
adapted by the Coalition Government. The conceptualisation provides the lens through 
which the policy shift from an integrated framework to a limited toolkit is examined. 
The following two sections identify the defining features and rationale of Labour’s 
framework and the Coalition’s toolkit, respectively. By way of conclusion, the paper 
identifies the marginalisation of holistic regeneration values in favour of economic growth 
objectives. 
 
STATE-LED REGENERATION: A BRIEF REVIEW OF CONCEPTUAL DEBATES 
The concept of ‘urban regeneration’ is used here as a catch-all term to encompass 
terms, such as ‘urban revitalisation’, ‘urban renewal’, ‘urban renaissance’ and similar terms, 
as regeneration is a contested concept with no universally accepted definition. Different 
terms have found favour in specific countries at particular times and related to certain 
interventions. Urban regeneration is traditionally understood to be concerned with 
economic, environmental and social aspects, yet with a preoccupation with physical 
development activities that seek to redress social imbalances. Roberts9 refers to urban 
regeneration as ‘a comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the 
resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in 
the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been 
subject to change’. Together with being a social, economic and environmental 
(physical) activity, regeneration is also a symbolic process that aims to foster a 
geography of hope. It carries an implicit message of resurrection, that ‘something new’ 
will be created, while simultaneously suggesting that a return to ‘better times’ is 
possible.10 It is such regenerative properties that are distinct from other public policy 
pursuits, such as economic growth and development. The hope that is often conveyed 
in regeneration initiatives suggests that it may help to repair what has been ravaged by 
capitalist uneven development. Urban regeneration is a form of place management 
predominantly concerned with the management of the micro spatial processes, but it 
could be argued that its neoliberal incarnation is preoccupied with the management of 
perceptions and products to help situate localities at the forefront of the global 
competition of cities.10 Critiquing the middle-class gentrifying logics and consumerist 
tendencies of neoliberal regeneration efforts, Lovering10 observes that it ‘is ubiquitously 
used to refer to a fairly standard set of policy goals and outcomes’. From this reading, 
regeneration responses, such as neoliberal repertoires, are emulated and mutated (to 
greater and lesser degrees) as part of the global–local mobilities of urban policy. This 
suggests that an examination of actually existing forms of practice in a particular 
jurisdiction may help to harvest lessons for other jurisdictions. 
The identification of regeneration sites is not a spontaneous process: indeed, it is the 
opposite. Places are specifically chosen for targeted spatial intervention as a ‘corrective’ 
to the processes of uneven development. In this sense, state-led regeneration is part of 
an ‘official strategy’,10 rolled out to alter representations, practices and urban formations. 
It is a particular urban policy repertoire intended to temper some of the most visible 
and deleterious manifestations of capitalist uneven development. Hence, the 
designation of urban regeneration sites for special state assistance. Where social 
objectives remain important, this can result in channelling of regeneration resources 
towards deprived communities through, for example, specific area-based mechanisms 
such as New Deal for Communities. Alternatively, where economic objectives preside, 
this can result in channelling regeneration resources towards places of perceived growth 
potential, such as edge of city centre sites that were the favoured sites of intervention 
by the UDCs. 
While many agents of regeneration consider that the central mission of regeneration is 
to improve the social climate, one tends, on cross-examination with project ‘outputs’, to 
find the striking dominance of ‘hard’ physical measures and outputs favoured over 
process. This paradox between stated strategic goals and ‘final’ delivery targets may 
explain why regeneration initiatives have long been criticised for failing to address deep-
rooted structural issues. Trebeck,11 for example, calls for a more nuanced understanding 
of transformations taking shape, which departs from the narrow range of socio-
economic indicators by focusing on overall ‘quality of life’, which may help to challenge 
the tenets of regeneration. Attempting to negotiate between demand-side objectives, 
such as tax incentives, and supply-side objectives, such as safe living environments, is a 
persistent issue. Consequently, the debate continues about the effectiveness of area-
based regeneration. Recent research provides some evidence to affirm that spatially 
targeting resources can reach concentrated pockets of poverty, but also cautions that 
the accuracy of targeting is non-uniform and, at a finer grain, found that the 
regeneration process bypasses many excluded people and households.12 
In political–economic terms, state-led regeneration is administered to help repair the 
social, environmental and economic repercussions of capitalist uneven development. It 
is a capitalist policy instrument intended to respond to and assuage the outcomes 
produced by capitalist frameworks — a safety net of sorts. Conceptually, state-led forms 
of regeneration therefore remain locked into the structural logics of capitalism. In 
practical terms, state-led regeneration is administered for a variety of purposes, but can 
be distilled as a distinct form of assistance channelled towards particular communities of 
places. Assistance may include financial resources, political support, fiscal incentives and 
policy tools. 
 
LABOUR’S REGENERATION FRAMEWORK 
In broad terms, the Labour administrations from 1997 to 2010 pursued two key strands 
of regeneration policy: ‘urban renaissance’, which encompassed design-led physical 
regeneration, with a city-centre focus; and ‘neighbourhood renewal’, specific area-based 
initiatives to tackle social exclusion. The Urban Task Force described the pressing need 
to create an urban renaissance, revitalising the urban core through high-quality design 
and the regeneration of brownfield sites, the review was heavily influenced by practice 
in European cities such as Barcelona. Neighbourhood Renewal was a central feature 
of the first two terms of the Labour administration; it formed the social justice strand of 
the New Labour vision. The delivery mechanism was to be a plethora of area-based 
initiatives to enable ‘problem spaces’ to increase their economic activity and narrow the 
gap with more prosperous localities; the end goal, as Tony Blair famously stated, was 
that no one should be ‘seriously disadvantaged by where they live’.13 In theory, there 
was the potential for the two key regeneration strands to support each other and 
create a holistic framework for regeneration, but in reality there were also significant 
contradictions14 and the potential for one agenda to undermine the other (see, for 
example, the substantial body of literature on gentrification).15 
The two major area-based policy initiatives pursued by Labour were the decade-long 
New Deal for Communities initiative (involving 39 deprived neighbourhoods) and the 
more widespread Neighbourhood Renewal initiative. Layer upon layer of area-based 
initiatives were introduced by New Labour, until the global economic conditions began 
to turn in 2007; the economic climate became toxic in September 2007 with the 
collapse of Northern Rock. The policy agenda then began to shift decisively from the 
holistic regeneration of place to the more modest aim to generate economic activity to 
bolster the flagging economy. 
‘Transforming places; changing lives: A framework for regeneration’,16 issued by the 
Department of Communities and Local Government encapsulated many of the key 
messages and ideologies replete in the Treasury’s SNR,5 which emphasised the 
tensions between neoliberal and neocommunitarian objectives: namely, increasing 
economic prosperity and reducing social inequality. The role of ‘Transforming places’ 
was to consult on a framework for confronting the root causes of deprivation in order to 
improve social justice by tackling the underlying economic challenges, which were 
perceived to be preventing places from reaching their potential. It aimed to: 
- tackle underlying economic challenges including worklessness by boosting 
enterprise; 
-  improve the coordination and prioritisation of regeneration investment; 
-  devolve power to more local levels so that programmes fit places through local 
and regional regeneration alignment. 
This was a clear recognition of the deep-seated deficiencies of previous state-led 
regeneration policies that had failed to overcome structural issues. Yet, ‘Transforming 
places’ remained locked into the structural logics of capitalism. It did not at any level 
seek to challenge the causes of uneven development. As a precursor to an enduring 
politics of austerity, Labour’s framework was intended to retain a safety net that would 
require less direct public assistance. 
Self-styled as ‘ambitious’, much of the framework was fabricated from existing initiatives. 
At the time of its launch, it was also feared that the proposals were a ‘done deal’, which 
had prompted practitioners to focus on the more technical aspects of the package of 
proposals rather than consider the overarching objectives.17 The technocratic nature of 
state-led regeneration was a defining feature of the Labour years. Focusing on meeting 
targets, evidencing returns on public investment and demonstrating efficiency savings 
diverted attention from broader questions relating to the purpose of regeneration. 
Extolling Third Way communitarian principles of helping people to help themselves by 
developing enterprising places to reduce worklessness, the framework laid out an 
agenda for improving the coordination and prioritisation of regeneration investment. 
Underpinning Labour’s drive to achieve better value for money from regeneration 
investment was the principle that ‘regeneration is a sub-set of economic development’. 
Prevalent here was the neoliberal orthodoxy that assumes areas of need and acute 
deprivation can be revitalised by spatially targeting investment in areas of opportunity. 
As a means of extracting ‘best value’ from regeneration, Labour’s technocratic method 
was to propose criteria to assess projects predicated on economic values, such as 
‘improving economic performance’ and ‘creating the conditions for business growth’. 
Driven by the intent to achieve better value for money from regeneration investment, 
the framework favoured an approach of enabling people to reach their full potential 
and preventing places from being held back economically, socially and environmentally. 
Referring to ‘decades of de-industrialisation and economic restructuring’ in the past 
tense indicated an extremely detached understanding of the economic challenges 
facing many urban and rural localities. The argument underpinning the framework was 
that direct investment in deprived neighbourhoods can often be very expensive 
compared with the economic uplift it generates, whereas reinforcing economic 
opportunities in central locations provides better value and greater success. Such 
economic tones were reminiscent of property-led regeneration initiatives launched in the 
1980s that abided by a ‘trickle-down’ theory. 
As part of Labour’s top-down managerialist and paternalistic regeneration policy, they 
had a hyperactive tendency of experimenting with new structures of governance, 
partnership arrangements, performance management measures and special-purpose 
bodies. Each of these operated across different, albeit overlapping, scales and variously 
involved different, albeit overlapping, constellations of public, private and community 
actors. For example, cross-sector Local Strategic Partnerships were responsible to 
central government for delivering against targets established in Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs), while at the same time Multi Area Agreements (MAAs) between groups of local 
authorities and other partners were established, which again were predicated on the 
annual delivery of central government targets. As one interviewee expressed, ‘Having 
been involved in previous MAA processes, MAAs felt very tangential to the real issues’. 
Such systems received criticism for devising technocratic institutional architecture and 
onerous reporting frameworks that recalibrated regeneration delivery away from the 
realities of particular communities of places. Indeed, post-2007 Labour’s scalar 
preference for neighbourhood-based area initiatives started to wane. This provided a 
key indication that part of the state-led regeneration safety net was being unravelled, 
although clothed in the rhetoric of enhanced coordination and greater prioritisation of 
regeneration resources — an economic investment. It was perhaps the technocratic 
complexity of state-led regeneration that helped to mask the retreat from seeking to 
address social needs. 
The framework suffered from some notable deficiencies. It lacked any consideration of 
how places of need can be more adeptly connected with places of opportunity, despite 
an escalation in area-based initiatives, partnerships and scales of governance over the 
preceding decade. Without a direct policy connection being made between places of 
need and opportunity, whereby connections would include a mixture of physical, social, 
cultural and economic relations, the Labour administration’s recognition that some places 
‘have been slower to bring about a significant reduction in the number of people without 
work, and deprivation is still intense in some areas’ was unlikely to find a suitable 
remedy. Hence, the state policy recognition of uneven development failed to 
comprehend, or at least acknowledge, that this is an outcome of capitalist modes of 
production, the result being that Labour’s regeneration framework was not so much a 
holistic frame of reference for providing an adequate safety net for tempering the most 
destructive effects of neoliberal capitalism, but was more precisely a state-led attempt to 
recalibrate regeneration to facilitate the ceaseless quest for economic growth. Put in 
other words, regeneration remained locked into the structural logics of capitalism, and 
the safety net was being unravelled to help some people and places to prosper. 
The economic climate had further deteriorated upon publication of ‘Taking forward the 
regeneration framework’.18 Consequently, the imperative of ‘tackling worklessness’, 
‘boosting enterprise’ and supporting business during a recession was amplified with 
£418m allocated to 20 Local Enterprise Growth Initiative partnerships between 2006 
and 2011, for example. By this stage, it was common for England regeneration 
practitioners to conceive of regeneration interventions as a means of delivering 
economic growth. Indeed, many considered that the primary role of regeneration was 
to promote prosperity, although this viewpoint remains more contested (especially 
among those operating at neighbourhood scales). In recognition of this prevalent 
regeneration mindset, the next section examines how regeneration has altered since 
the Coalition entered office in May 2010. 
 
THE COALITION’S REGENERATION TOOLKIT 
Signalled in the pre-election political party manifestos, it quickly became apparent that 
with the installation of a Coalition Government Labour’s technocratic approach, 
including their regeneration framework, did not fit with the Coalition’s ‘economic growth’ 
and ‘localism’ crusade.2 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the ‘Local growth’ White Paper19 
rarely mentions ‘regeneration’, which is in stark contrast to the political attention that 
regeneration as a policy field received under Labour.20 The term ‘regeneration’, as is 
also the case with ‘regions/regionalism’,6,21 has been largely omitted from the 
Coalition’s vocabulary and, more importantly, this discursive absence has had a direct 
impact on regeneration programmes, as ministers have refrained from establishing any 
bespoke regeneration initiatives. If the state-led regeneration safety net was being 
unravelled by Labour, has this safety net been completely dispensed with by the 
Coalition? 
 Arguably, it was a result of the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Committee’s decision to launch an inquiry into regeneration that 
prompted the Coalition hastily to produce ‘Regeneration to enable growth: What 
government is doing in support of community-led regeneration’.22 This rudimentary 
toolkit is limited to a few pages of text and some appendices. Of central concern, the 
toolkit offered no definition of regeneration.23 The Coalition has refused to define 
‘regeneration’, claiming that ‘it is not for Government to define what regeneration is, 
what it should look like or what measures should be used to drive it’. In contrast, the 
Scottish Government published a comprehensive regeneration strategy at about the 
same time, which defines regeneration as ‘the holistic process of reversing the 
economic, physical and social decline of places where market forces won’t suffice’,24 
consistent with Roberts’ definition of ‘holistic’ regeneration and similar to the notion of 
regeneration that guides Wales’ ‘New regeneration framework’, which was published in 
March 2013.25 This affirms that the retreat from holistic notions of regeneration, 
consistent with a politics of austerity, is not necessarily a hegemonic trend. Indeed, 
England is distinct from other nations of the UK when it comes to conceptualising (or 
not) the goals and principles of state-led regeneration. 
Refusing to define regeneration and refraining from sanctioning any area-based 
regeneration initiatives of note was a clear signal of the Coalition’s approach to fiscal 
purging: a localism gripped by financial cuts and devolving austerity. Indeed, denigrating 
the state as part of the problem would unleash further ‘incapacitation’, which Peck has 
observed across US cities.1 Neglecting regeneration practice and experience 
accumulated over several decades, the Coalition’s approach towards regeneration has 
been characterised as commencing from ‘year zero’.26 More accurately, they eviscerated 
Labour’s technocratic framework and prevalent regeneration practice of the 1990s and 
2000s, which attempted to be holistic in its scope, design and intent. Yet, the Coalition 
also borrowed from and adapted the neoliberal repertoire of tools pioneered during 
the 1980s, such an incentive-based mechanisms. 
The outcome was that, for the first time in several decades, England was left bereft of a 
genuine regeneration strategy and accompanying dedicated resources. Under the 
guise of ‘localism’, the Coalition has, instead, provided a toolkit of instruments, from the 
New Homes Bonus to EZs, which are intended to dispense financial rewards for 
additional housing delivery and incentivise additional business investment, respectively. 
More so, the toolkit is replete with incentives, tools and policies that convey a myopic 
mantra of ‘economic growth at any costs’. The sole focus on the economics of 
regeneration signifies a deepening of neoliberal regeneration policy encapsulated in 
Labour’s framework. Akin to Labour, the repercussions of uneven patterns of 
development, such as worklessness or deprivation, are considered by the Coalition to 
be a drag anchor on the quest for economic growth. To put it another way, the 
Coalition has completed Labour’s recalibration of regeneration from a state policy 
primarily administered to address societal challenges to one primarily administered to 
attend to market demands. Distinct from Labour’s approach, which perceived 
technocracy to be paramount to managing the regeneration problem, the Coalition 
perceive the ‘big state’ to be the foremost problem. Worryingly, the toolkit relies on 
many instruments launched in the 1980s that appear to rely implicitly on the much 
maligned ‘trickle-down’ theory. It is unclear how localist community-led regeneration can 
be reconciled with top-down policies, such as EZs, and centrally administered resources, 
such as the Regional Growth Fund (RGF). 
Indeed, Lord Heseltine, the Chair of the RGF Independent Advisory Panel, was resolute 
that the £2.6bn RGF ‘is not about regeneration’. A number of respondents commented 
on the manner that the RGF had centralised funding decisions for what limited public 
resources remained available, with one respondent stating: 
 ‘The RGF nationalised decision making — decisions are being made without the 
benefits of local knowledge. The process is flawed compared to the previous approach 
… [which] brought a lot of local strategic knowledge to the decision making process.’ 
Notwithstanding substantial criticisms of some of Labour’s regeneration machinery, 
which a significant proportion of regeneration agents perceived to be ‘very tangential to 
the real issues’, in rendering such technocracy obsolete, the Coalition’s toolkit had also 
dispensed with ‘a lot of local strategic knowledge’, often accumulated over many years 
of practice.27,28 The withering of regeneration as a public policy priority has been 
accompanied by a loss of skills, tacit knowledge and expertise. Views held by 
practitioners and councillors suggest that the present ‘austerity-era regeneration’ 
approach is a retrograde step: 
 ‘At the end of the day you only get regeneration outputs when money is spent, jobs 
are created or bricks are laid, for me it is about actual delivery and I can’t see where the 
delivery mechanism is going to be’ 
The deficiency of mechanisms to aid regeneration helps to draw attention to spatial 
implications of a localism gripped by austerity. Despite claims that the Coalition’s toolkit 
is designed to enable community-led regeneration, it has not gone unnoticed that risks 
and responsibilities have been devolved, but local autonomy over funding decisions has 
not followed suit. It is in this sense that Peck refers to ‘an urbanization of neoliberal 
austerity’, whereby it is something that central government does to local authorities, 
and local authorities do to deprived neighbourhoods.1 Austerity is devolved, but it can 
only be devolved so far. In the case of state-led regeneration, this is usually the 
neighbourhood scale, and thus it is those deprived neighbourhoods that suffer 
disproportionately. This analysis helps to unmask the spatial injustice that secretes the 
structural apparatus of the Coalition’s neoliberal toolkit. Several interviewees indicated 
that the preference for economic opportunism (over socio-economic need) is likely to 
result in some longer-term spatial implications: 
 ‘Those communities where you have affluent, prosperous and well educated people are 
ready to take up the challenge. These are the places that don’t need regeneration. The 
places that need it are the places that don’t have … the aspirations, abilities, skills — 
they are the ones that will be left behind.’ 
Although a scenario of some communities of places being ‘left behind’ was widely 
recognised by agents of regeneration, and supported by evidence from the propensity 
of emergent Neighbourhood Plans to correspond with communities of places of 
‘prosperous and well educated people ready to take up the challenge’, there was a 
sense of resignation — particularly among local government practitioners — that there 
are no alternatives. It was as if the future path of regeneration had already been 
marked and a change in direction would not be possible. This was quite surprising, 
and can be contrasted with the rhetoric of localism that intends to offer enhanced 
freedoms, flexibilities and incentives that reward innovation. 
There was a gut instinct among the majority of research participants that the Coalitions’ 
approach was, at least in part, ideologically driven; a sense of an unfinished political 
agenda from the Thatcher era, although ‘this latest austerity offensive is being 
prosecuted under historically and geographically distinctive conditions’, that commences 
from an already neoliberalised configuration.1 Hall29 concurs, suggesting that, in the 
1980s, only severe Inner City riots stopped the Thatcher administration carrying out a 
more extreme neoliberal agenda, by leaving ‘the Northern regions and cities [to] face 
inevitable decline’. Such a policy theme was revived by the Policy Exchange in their 
2008 report ‘Cities unlimited’.30 Hall questions the future for the north, now that the 
Coalition has rapidly begun to remove the palliative of public-sector and quasi-public-
sector jobs from the region: 
 ‘Is it simply proposed to cut off the codeine and the tranquilisers that have eased their 
long-drawn-out pain over the last three decades, leaving them on a minimal life 
support? Or is the real intention … to leave the North to wither and facilitate a great 
drift south?’29 
This fear, of a downscaled austerity politics actually existing in many American cities,1 
was echoed by research participants, with one public-sector interviewee observing that 
‘[r]egeneration doesn’t feel like it has a place in [the Coalitions’ approach] — 
regeneration steps in where things aren’t working, but this governments’ attitude is, you 
just let the market take care of that’. In political–economic terms, the recalibration of 
state-led regeneration means that its administration to help repair the social, 
environmental and economic repercussions of capitalist uneven development is 
becoming more infrequent. The depth of austerity measures, involving the retreat of 
public-sector spending, reduced welfare support as part of a strategy to ‘make work pay’ 
and a focus on supporting ‘real’ jobs in the private sector, has proved challenging for 
many communities of places. This pernicious situation led one interviewee to argue 
that: ‘The UK governments’ policy of “don’t worry lads, the public sector will contract and 
everyone will get a job in the private services sector”, that just doesn’t work outside 
London and the South East’. 
Indeed, those familiar with the growing socio-economic inequalities within and across 
London and the South East,31 would prompt a reaction that a regeneration safety net 
is warranted in all parts of England. The localism agenda, which, in the words of one 
research participant, challenges communities to ‘sink or swim’, is showing signs of 
reinforcing the competitive advantages enjoyed by more affluent places with economic 
potential and penalising those places traditionally the beneficiaries of additional state 
support.32 Conceptually, this may indicate that not only are current state-led forms of 
regeneration locked into the structural logics of capitalism, but they have been 
recalibrated to support primarily capitalist growth. Equally, the Coalition’s offer of 
greater autonomy to localities could be interpreted as a ‘double edged sword’, as one 
respondent stated that: ‘sometimes increased autonomy has come with reduced 
resources, sometimes it has felt like it has come down to us to make decisions where 
we cut investment rather than where we can make investment’. 
From the situated perspective of this agent of regeneration, ‘localism’ could be readily 
equated with ‘cuts’. This raises new questions that concern whether greater autonomy 
has compensated for public-sector disinvestment. The Coalition’s preference for a 
‘toolkit’ over a ‘framework’ is perhaps instructive, as the former exudes connotations of 
self-help, where only the most basic tools are provided. Despite the toolkit’s use of the 
phrase ‘community-led regeneration’, there appears to be a chasm, which continues to 
widen, between such bottom-up initiatives and the top-down economic growth 
incentives (a chasm that was also all too apparent in Labour’s framework). 
The Coalition’s approach to regeneration has been to treat it as a non-policy. In a 
report published by the Work Foundation, it was argued that, ‘Without regeneration, 
the most deprived communities in the UK will have little chance of economic 
recovery’.8 Interview responses corroborate this assessment and also extend it by 
suggesting that the loss of institutional capacity would have a disproportionate impact 
on peripheral regions: ‘The loss of One North East will have a far greater impact than 
the loss of SEEDA for example. RDAs [Regional Development Agencies] were at the 
forefront of things: they were the “players” not the local authorities’. Conversely, a 
different interviewee highlighted the positive aspects of the process: ‘taking the RDAs 
away and giving us a more direct relationship with the government … we are much 
closer to the people making policy, we have got a much better access around, 
opportunities like City Deals or Enterprise Zones’. 
In a practical sense, there was a unanimous current of belief that replacing some of 
Labour’s machinery, especially LAAs and MAAs, with more streamlined systems had 
improved central–local government relations. What the above interviewee extract also 
helps to identify is that a localist mindset is yet to penetrate the approach of all 
regeneration practitioners. The research participants held a strong presumption that 
central government are ‘the [only] people making policy’.  This also serves to support 
the perspective highlighted earlier ‘that there are no alternatives’.  With most research 
participants taking a pragmatic stance that ‘as a society we cannot expect the same 
levels of service previous generations have enjoyed’, it was also noted that the ‘onus has 
moved to [communities] from government — “do it for yourself or don’t have it”’ localist 
brand of regeneration. In Peck’s terminology, it reflects ‘[t]he neoliberal proclivity for 
downloading, by way of responsibility dumping and devolved discipline’.1 The implication 
is that, in some communities, there are particular cases where bottom-up forms of 
regeneration are thriving as they respond in creative ways to the shift from a grant 
funding regime to an incentives regime. Examples of community-operated post offices, 
public houses and village shops abound, together with the success stories associated 
with the transfer of ‘assets’ to voluntary-sector organisations. In practical terms, these are 
examples at a fine-grain scale of communities stepping in where the market (and state) 
will not. The perverse feature of this trend, however, is that it is often, although not 
entirely, areas of opportunity that are benefitting from the regeneration toolkit devised 
for an age of austerity. In conceptual terms, communities equipped for the task (eg 
socially, culturally, professionally, financially) are able to provide their own safety nets. 
Whereas some interviewees suggested that deprived communities have been 
‘forgotten’, an alternative perspective is that the Coalition Government (as well as other 
political factions such as Blue Labour and Red Tory) has represented deprived 
communities as an ‘undeserving poor’, signifying the end of more holistic forms of 
regeneration as we have come to know it.33 Respondents also remarked ruefully that ‘it 
was not a great time to be in government [as a politician or officer], whatever your 
politics’, with one interviewee elaborating on this sentiment by stating: 
 ‘There is an economic dimension but there is also a political dimension, in that the 
government has had to prioritise in terms of spending decisions … regeneration 
expenditure has been less protected than some other forms of expenditure; like the 
NHS [National Health Service] or adult social care.’ 
It is such a sentiment that affirms the argument that the public policy field of 
regeneration has withered. Political choices have been made that have resulted in 
budget raids at national scales and left regeneration resources unprotected at local 




This paper has demonstrated the withering of more holistic area-based regeneration 
policy ideals over recent years, specific to the geography of England and its unique 
historical conditions. This is in stark contrast to the halcyon days of regeneration 
experienced from the mid-1990s through to the latter part of the 2000s.Yet, a return to 
a regeneration paradigm of yesteryear is not being advocated. The issue at hand has 
been to draw attention to the recalibration of regeneration that has taken place, often 
concealed by de facto austerity measures and austerity politics. 
Labour’s regeneration framework attempted to outline how people, organisations and 
information could be marshalled more effectively to tackle deprivation and improve 
social justice by tackling the underlying economic challenges that are impeding places 
from prospering. It conceived regeneration as ‘a sub-set of economic development’, 
which was used to support a narrative that areas of acute deprivation could be ‘lifted 
up’ by targeting resources in areas of opportunity. Yet, numerous observers have noted 
that a ‘rising tide’ does not lift all boats by the same height,34 and the results can leave 
some places ‘sunk’ in poverty. Despite such ‘costs’, the approach outlined in the 
Coalition’s regeneration toolkit has intensified the competitive nature by which 
prospective projects bid for government support. In addition, the ‘incentives’ on offer are 
spatially selective, favouring only some social groups and some places. Substantiated 
by empirical material, this paper has demonstrated how the incentives regime rarely 
favours deprived communities and has helped to unmask a spatially unjust neoliberal 
toolkit. The present policy preference is to target public resources in ‘value-added’ 
schemes that favour private-oriented objectives in a highly unbalanced way. This 
criticism can be traced back several decades, but has grown in prominence over more 
recent times. Indeed, it has been normalised by an austere state strategy, which has 
created a discursive space, which suggests that there are no alternatives. Most recently, 
‘regeneration’ as a state-led policy objective and political concern has been virtually 
expunged from the Coalition lexicon. ‘Regeneration’ now appears to be at the mercy 
of capitalists seeking to maximise exchange values: a process contingent on market 
decrees of viability. In the words of one interviewee: 
 ‘Regeneration won’t happen until economic development progresses and we see an 
upturn in economic activity, which will increase demand and that will start to fuel 
development, which will move into some major regeneration projects. Demand and 
finance are currently a depressant on the whole sector.’ 
It is as if regeneration is no longer considered to be a role for the state. There is a 
perception held by some agents of regeneration that regeneration needs to ride on 
the wave of economic growth. Hence, austerity politics has been accepted 
- largely without debate and resistance 
- as a convenient truth.  
Such views also affirm the broader point that state-led forms of regeneration remain 
locked into the structural logics of capitalism. But significantly, regeneration is no longer 
locked into repairing the destructive tendencies of capitalist uneven development; 
rather, it is locked into assisting the quest for continued economic growth. 
While space does not permit the analysis of counter-regeneration strategies, views 
from the coalface indicated the complexity of locally derived regeneration practice and 
pointed towards some instances of progressive alternatives. Therefore, the apparent 
post-political consensus repositioning regeneration as a means to enable economic 
growth needs to be tempered with insights derived from practice on the ground — the 
actually existing forms of regeneration that often challenge and adapt state-led 
regeneration conceptions in novel and creative ways. Distinct from state-led 
regeneration initiatives that have been experimented with over several decades by 
political parties of different hues, actually existing forms of ‘community-led’ may offer 
some useful pointers to inform the design of future policy. Questioning the validity of 
subsuming regeneration to a neoliberal capitalist logic that ‘the market knows best’, the 
research indicates that the reverse may prove to be productive: understanding 
economic development as a sub-set of regeneration. Indeed, economic development is 
just one of several components collectively required to regenerate social spaces. 
The curtailment of broader regeneration debates has framed discussions limited to the 
depth of cuts, the speed of implementation and the spatial distribution of such 
measures. The result is that regeneration, understood as a capitalist policy instrument 
intended to respond to and assuage the outcomes produced by capitalist frameworks, 
is no more. The safety net of sorts has largely been subsumed by a single-minded 
pursuit of economic growth, unless one is fortunate to reside in a community of place 
that is equipped for the task of community-led regeneration. Insights from agents of 
regeneration suggest that these communities rarely align with the most deprived 
communities in most need of state-led regeneration assistance. A challenge for those 
wishing to pursue holistically framed patterns of regeneration in an era dominated by 
austerity politics must go well beyond technocratic and resource issues by restoring 
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